Patterns of Public Policy and Administration:

Identifying Interfaces and Relationships

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Introduction

This paper compares Theodore Lowi's Distributive, Redistributive, Constituent and Regulatory policy types as they influence administrative patterns. By recognizing high level interfaces in politics, leaders may be more decisive. For instance, they may be more effective in delegating administrative tasks. A spectrum of policy making exists, but by articulating the relationships between political entities, some patterns can be discerned. Administration-based patterns, from the work of Luther Gulick (1937), have recently been described and extended (Chalekian, 2013b). Regarding the work of a Chief Executive, some have indicated how Gulick's POSDCORB may be enduring (Stillman, 1991; Raadschelders & Lee, 2011). POSDCORB stands for Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting (Gulick, 1937). Based on the patterns within, we may view and articulate the various interfaces and relationships between politics and administration.

The intent of the author is to develop and compare sets of patterns. But in brevity, class-based differences (i.e. societal factors) could possibly rile. Lowi provided the descriptions (1972) and, in the study of politics, his categories have received a great deal of use (Meier, 1987; Ripley & Franklin, 1986; 1991). However, the relations between public administration (PA) and public policy (PP) may receive a renewed focus. Lowi's types continue to be discussed (cf. Spitzer, 1987; Anderson, 1997; Kellow, 2009; Lowi, 2010). As a well-known practitioner and scholar, Gulick noted how POSDCORB elements are used throughout administration (1937). These seven will be presented for each type, but the interface between politics and administration is key.

Regarding scope, the consensus among political scientists is that within the realm of public policy, Lowi's types approach completeness. A policy range can be fully recognized when classified into Lowi's types because they are both mutually exclusive and exhaust all possibilities (Lowi, 2010). One scholar found that the traditional principles of efficiency and effectiveness and the activities summarized by POSDCORB fully explain the purposes and processes of public administrator's work (Fairholm, 2004). Thus, the breadth of this paper is wide. Being timeworn terms, what are some of the problems?

For starters, politics have become increasingly contentious. Some have entered into administration without training (or politics without experience) and they may lack an overall view. Gulick's POSDCORB was used to structure the teaching of graduate-level PA (Stillman, 1991). But in addition, the implementation of policy has become exceedingly difficult. Political appointees or top-level administrators may not know the relationships – or what to do. It is possible their focus would be on congressional leaders, whereas congressional subcommittees could be the focus. What is the difference? According to Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin (1986; 1991), the interfaces and intensities

of the relationships vary. But the most salient issues have become nearly impossible to administer. As a partial solution, this paper presents some interdisciplinary terms.

The author wishes to extend the concept of an Object-oriented Government, having "…sets of modules that can be combined dynamically, depending on dynamically determined results" (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p. 49). The parts, tailored to changing circumstances, can apply to organizational structures (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995). Again, the domain of politics and administration is wide. But, as described by Adele Goldberg and Kenneth Rubin, an object-oriented government is a framework of interacting parts, regulated by law, that "composes a government" (p. 49). They elaborate further, whereby a "delegation of responsibility to operating units, loosely coupled dependencies among these operating units, and reuse of policies and procedures—these are the hallmarks of an object-oriented government" (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p. 49). This paper will extend some object-oriented[1] concepts in the context of politics.

A Background on Lowi's Policy Types

Some descriptions are embedded in Lowi's Distributive (1st) pattern; and whatever is being distributed has value. For example, the use of multiple social inheritance (MSI) will be defined and described. The Redistributive (2nd) pattern is an extension of being Distributive, with a re-prefix, but more complexly, this type has revenue seeking attributes. The use of *reverse* multiple social inheritance (RMSI) and other techniques will be discussed. The Constituent (3rd) type is the default ("catch-all") pattern. This category may include laws about laws, or rulemaking (Meier, 1987); thus, it may be more detailed than the others. The need for re-organization is a big endeavor for a jurisdiction; to accomplish this, a Chief Executive may use organizational polymorphism (OP) and/or socio-encapsulation (SO), as well as MSI. In the US, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a huge reorganization example. The final Regulatory (4th) pattern is the most succinct – benefitting from the terms presented.

The purpose of this paper is to identify policy-based interfaces. The first part will provide an overview of the four policy types. Some object-oriented concepts will be introduced. Next, the PA dimensions will be presented. The structures of the patterns will be then be provided. The patterns are subsequently shown, following the structure. A brief discussion of the patterns will provide a synthesis of some overarching themes. Finally, we will assess administrative effectiveness and offer some conclusions.

Distributive

In transition, a brief synopsis of the intent, problems and structure of each pattern follows. Distributive policies decentralize the award of a federal largess "to a seemingly unlimited number of recipients – individuals, groups and corporations" (Ripley & Franklin, 1991, p. 76). The intent of this pattern is to increase inter-organizational awareness. The problem is that there may be discontent among elected officials. The number of recipients may grow and the sufficiency of amounts is key.

There are two phases of forces: legitimizing the policy – with power – and the implementation of policy – with coercion. Note that suasion is seldom applicable in implementing distributive policies. This is because the recipient entities and individuals voluntarily participate or solicit help. For legislation, a sub-government "Iron Triangle" (LeLoup, 1988) can exist. With emphasis from Ripley and Franklin (1991),

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[1] Object-Oriented has been defined as "[a] product, process, or resource that can be extended by composition of existing parts or by refinement of behaviors" (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, P. 512). Also, see the Glossary at the end.

they commonly consist of 1) a congressional subcommittee (mid-right), 2) the receptive bureau (mid-left), and 3) elements of the private sector (Figure 1). Variations via dimmed arrows also exist.


Figure 1. Relationships for Distributive Policy Types (From Ripley & Franklin, 1991, p. 184)

A subcommittee is a subdivision of a United States Congressional committee that considers specified matters and reports back to the full committee (retrieved from Wikipedia 6/30/2014). This may seem hierarchical with one more subcommittees embedded *within* the Senate or Congress. However, proposals for legislation can be stalled, *never* discussed or effectively *terminated* in a subcommittee. Thus, they are correctly positioned as being separate from Congress (and not within). Also in figure 1 is the private sector (bottom), which may include a group of individuals, corporations or interest groups (Ripley & Franklin, 1991). Lobbyists often represent these interests.

The relations between the three (dark arrows) will be described, but the *key* focus is on the Bureau. A receptive bureau (mid-left) is the government entity with the authority to implement a policy. Examples are the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The term "Subsystem" has been described (Meier, 1987), consisting of a triumvirate of a bureau, a congressional subcommittee, and relevant interest groups who "in normal political times can act independently of the major political actors" (p. 49). The link between policy-making in Distributive types, and the bureau-based tasks are key.

A primary source of funding (to be distributed) is the Federal fund. These are revenue receipts not restricted to a specific purpose and "are used to pay for the general activities of

government" (LeLoup, 1988, p. 41). Through legal entitlements, recipients at various levels are deemed to be eligible. Distributions of funds may originate from the highest level, or via a series of government layers. If the layers simply "pass through" the funds (with limited oversight), these may be deemed an "empty class." A *class* is a template for the creation of instances (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995). This structure has been detected in the implementation of layered policies with phrases like "Same as above" (Ripley & Franklin, 1986, p. 12). Empty classes in government are those in which a structure is present, but little – if any – administration occurs. Limited budgetary oversight may occur (although unlikely). However, if there *is* oversight of the flow of funds, then a full range of patterns may be invoked, including the administration-based tasks of POSDCORB.[2]

In a way, the money is inherited from a default group. Multiple Social Inheritance (MSI), a technique for people-based design, can partially explain the flow of funds. MSI is defined, whereby it is the feature of a language which supports the definition of a new entity as an extension of one or more existing entities, such that the new entity inherits existing information and behavior or values or sufficiency (Chalekian, 2013b). In the case of Distributive policies, information about the criteria is provided. Further, political *values* can be associated with *sufficiency* (i.e. money). From top to bottom, MSI is applied as people (staff or recipients) or objects (accounting systems or banks) may, at times, hold funds.

Distributive policy specifies the constituents who are to receive tangible benefits (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). With entitlement, Organizational Polymorphism may be invoked as the funds are to be disbursed, whether distributed generally (at higher levels), or specifically (at lower levels). Defined herein, Organizational Polymorphism (OP) has features of the language whereby it is possible to send the same message to different objects or people and elicit a distinct but semantically similar response from those objects or people, with coordination and control (Chalekian, 2013b). "Polycentricity" and "Nested Enterprises" have been detected within government activities (Ostrom, 2005). Within enacted Distributive policies, an informative proclamation has been made, invoking OP, in that monies are to be disbursed. How that disbursal is administered may vary at different levels of government.

One government level might plan disburse to another government level, who might plan to disburse to yet another, who might finally disburse to individuals. Socio-encapsulation (SE) has been defined as having features of a language whereby the language supports the representation of information and information processing as a single unit that combines the behavior or values or sufficiency with the information needed to carry out the behavior or values or sufficiency (Chalekian, 2013b). SE may occur as monies may be grouped (default or allocated) and held at various levels. For example, grant writers may try to obtain funds within the specifications of local-, state- or federal-levels, but not necessarily all. Thus, a federal grant from FEMA may be a "pass through."

Among the public policies discussed here, the Distributive type is the least contentious. One reason is that the source of funds may be relatively vague (or general). Once legitimized, Distributive policies may have limited structural oversight (i.e. "empty classes") between the layers, but other methods such as MSI, OP or SE may be invoked as a group or in part. Regardless, the administrative patterns of POSDCORB can be active, as *sufficiency* is key.

Redistributive

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[2] See the Public Administration Dimensions section for more detailed POSDCORB descriptions.

A central substantive question regarding Redistributive policy is who wins and at whose expense (Ripley & Franklin, 1991). The intent of this pattern is to clarify the associated interfaces and relationships. The problem is that there may, again, be discontent. The number of recipients may grow and they will often block legislation. Again, there are two phases of forces, legitimizing the policy with power and the implementation of policy with coercion. But, unlike Distributive policies, more forceful coercion may be necessary, especially in the case of those individuals or entities who fail to pay. In common with Distributive policies--*sufficiency* is key.

It is problematic that the monies funding Redistributive programs come from distinct groups (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). As a result, these policies are the most contentious. Discontent can occur among elected officials and those who vote for them. Similar to Distributive legislation, once an entitlement is enacted, the number of recipients may grow and again, the recipients will work to protect the flow of incoming funds by any means possible.

Another sub-government may exist, but with some different entities (Figure 2). Maintaining a triangle-like configuration, they consist of 1) a congressional leader (top-right), 2) a centralized bureau closely associated with the Chief Executive (top-left) and, again, 3) elements of the private sector. These have been articulated and elaborated upon in the works of Ripley and Franklin (1986; 1991) and Kenneth Meier (1987).


Figure 2. Relationships for Redistributive Policy Types (From Ripley & Franklin, 1991, p. 184)

Note in Figure 2, how a primary relationship may be with a Congressional leader (Ripley & Franklin, 1991) at least more so than in Figure 1. Once legitimized, the implementation of a policy, via one or more levels, is needed. Money flows from those who are taxed towards those who receive, with one or more interceding bureaus. A type of reverse Multiple Social Inheritance (RMSI) is revealed in that valuations (monies) are drawn from some constituents or corporations and returned, while considering sufficiency, to others. Being a contentious policy type, the president or highest level Chief Executive (top-left) is involved. As a result, most administrative patterns, such as POSDCORB, are invoked; however, in some instances, a "pass through" or "empty class" may be applicable. Note also how a centralization (Figure 2, upper left) of administrative functions is shown. An example would be central personnel administration to assist with tax- and spending-based hiring.

Contentiously, individuals, groups or corporations make payments to a receptive bureau. These may or may not be sources of a general fund. Like Distributive policies, and via entitlement, recipients are eligible to receive funds. The distributions may be at the highest government level, or via a series of layers.[3] Like with Distributive policies, if there *is* oversight into the flow of funds, then the administrative patterns would be invoked. The organizations associated with Redistributive policies are more likely to be rule bound bureaucracies, invoking all POSDCORB-based patterns, but predominantly budget control.

The money is often inherited from a top-level group. RMSI, and then MSI, can show how the funds first flow up – from bottom to top – and then down – from top to bottom – as people (staff) or objects (treasuries) hold the funds. This up and down will be shown in the Redistributive pattern below. Again, the concept of monetary *sufficiency* is key. The less there is to dole out, the less there is to collect. Organizational Polymorphism (OP) may be invoked, via entitlement, as monies are to be disbursed, whether generally with coordination (at higher to lower levels), or specifically with control (at lower levels). Socio-encapsulation (SE) may occur as monies are controlled, grouped, or held in accounts.

In sum, Redistributive policies are highly contentious. Entitlements create issues (LeLoup, 1988). Broad directives--such as *sufficiency*--may originate from the Chief Executive. Methods such as RMSI, MSI, OP or SE may be invoked as a group or in part, with Reverse Multiple Social Inheritance present, for funding. RMSI and MSI indicate the flow, while OP and SE—as well as the other POSDCORB tasks—are paths toward implementation.

Constituent

The intent of Constituent policies is to describe the policy types not specified above (excluding the Regulatory policy type, forthcoming). Constituent policies are often used to describe meta-policies and rulemaking (Meier, 1987). These patterns are of particular importance, as those who "know the rules" often succeed. Identifying the interfaces and relationships may increase the conceptual understanding of political processes. Political *values* are key.

The problem is that those who are in command of the rules may become exceedingly powerful. In a spectrum of force (i.e. power, coercion and suasion), the utmost power may be invoked, as well as manipulation (Anderson, 1997). Subsequently, those who do not

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[3] If the layers are a simple "pass through" of funds (with limited budgetary oversight), these may be deemed an "empty class."

know the rules may be controlled by those who do. In a representative democracy, the goal is widespread participation; however, those in power may simply maintain the status quo.

As with the prior policy types, a triangle may exist for Constituent Policy. But raw power from one individual (i.e. a "politician" or long-standing elected official) may be used. Since this is a catch-all policy, all of the other triangle-like configurations may be invoked depending on necessity.

By revealing policy-based meta-patterns, more individuals could possibly participate. The method is via a series of legal frameworks, and aspects of MSI, OP and SE are invoked. (Note: if RMSI were used, the policy would be Redistributive.) In the middle layers of government, different aspects of policy may be appropriate, depending on existing laws and their ultimate application/implementation. This was detected in layers with a state and/or local focus (Ripley & Franklin, 1986).

Lacking these frames, aspects of governing could vary widely. The main players are lawmakers, but the chief executive and association lobbyists may be influential. In some instances, a "pass through" or "empty class" may be appropriate. This is usually the case with broad directives (such as inalienable rights); in contrast to lower-level discretionary bureaus (Downs, 1967), these policies must be upheld. The implementation of policy may be at the federal level, or it may be more fully implemented at the state or local level. Since enactments are among levels, MSI is invoked by passing societal values.[4]

The resulting legislation may be socially encapsulated (SE) into objects (i.e. constitutions, laws, policies, bureaus or budgets) or people. Individuals—or their positions—may gain the authority to regulate hiring, carry out policies, or administer budgets. At the various levels (federal, state or local), most POSDCORB-based patterns would be invoked. These may involve "empty classes" via a centralized bureau. Compared to the other three, Constituent-based policies are the most complex. They may invoke the widest fluctuations in budgeting. Reorganizations may be staged. However, the pattern can indicate the most advanced concepts of governing as *values* are key.

Regulatory

Regulatory policies control the *behavior* of groups. These are applicable when they act outside established societal norms. The main categories are protective and competitive, involving producers and consumers (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). The intent of the pattern is to yield additional insights into plausible interfaces and relationships.

In contrast to money, a passage of information and *behaviors* is invoked. Although regulatory policies may seek harmony, an entity affected by the policy can be contentious. Many believe the influence of government should be limited. They may see the world as having boundless resources and resiliency, and restrictions imposed by governments may seem unjust. If domains are considered "commons," challenges can occur (Ostrom, 1990).

An enabling of authority, and a specific area of regulation, must occur. Like the other types, a receptive bureaucracy exists to carry out the policy. Transfers of authority may occur between one or more levels of government. Informative regulations may be consulted by the affected entities and they may comply. However, the bureaus empowered

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[4] In addition, Constituent type policies may have expensive capital projects.

to carry out the policy sometimes find non-compliance. Suasion at the lowest levels of communication (Anderson, 1997) may be applicable.

As with the other policies, complex frameworks for regulation may exist. Therein policies are implemented mostly at the federal level (Ripley & Franklin, 1986), but more specifically by lower level laws. Specific contexts of the highest level frames are often removed. The flow is usually downward where specific elements of implementation are enforced. As with the Redistributive policy type, a triangulation of forces may exist with a protective regulatory type. This is composed of 1) the President and centralized bureaucracy, 2) Congress, and 3) the private sector (Ripley & Franklin, 1991).[5]

Less formal governing may occur within geographically disbursed areas such as watersheds (Ostrom, 1990). Discretion may be allowed, but the sub-levels must be consistent with the top-most framework. For instance, Organizational Polymorphism (OP) may be invoked with both general (coordinated) and specific (controlled) regulations. Information about acceptable *behaviors*, via law, are passed. Since regulation may be done *among* levels, MSI could be invoked by passing along limitations on said *behaviors*. Again, these are encapsulated (SE) into objects or people (i.e. who have discretion or power).

During implementation, all POSDCORB-based patterns would be invoked (except perhaps a rights-based "pass through"). These may involve "empty classes." In summary, Regulation-based policies are often set with rules originating from a central entity. At the local government level, contention may exist as *behaviors* are key.

Public Administration Dimensions

As mentioned above, PA invokes action in at least two areas: the formulation of policy alternatives and the implementation of those policies. Entire books have been written on these areas (Ripley & Franklin, 1986; 1991). Again, Gulick (1937) described organizational patterns as: Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting. These seven will be used to further identify the diversity of policy and administration relationships.

Gulick answered "POSDCORB" to his hypothetical question: "[w]hat is the work of the chief executive?" (Gulick, 1937:13). The acronym was generally acknowledged as ". . . the definitive statement on the 'principles' approach to managing organizations" (Shafritz and Hyde, 1987:40). Addressing the tasks of upper levels of management, Gulick – with the first letters bolded below – described the parts as:

> "**P**lanning, that is working out in broad outline the things that need to be done and the methods for doing them to accomplish the purpose set for the enterprise;
>
> **O**rganizing, that is the establishment of the formal structure of authority through which work subdivisions are arranged, defined and co-ordinated for the defined objective;
>
> **S**taffing, that is the whole personnel function of bringing in and training the staff and maintaining favorable conditions of work;

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[5] A "pass through" or empty class may exist if the regulation of *behavior* at a level of government is inappropriate.

Directing, that is the continuous task of making decisions and embodying them in specific and general orders and instructions and serving as the leader of the enterprise;

Co-ordinating, that is the all important duty of interrelating the various parts of the work;

Reporting, that is keeping those to whom the executive is responsible informed as to what is going on, which thus includes keeping himself and his subordinates informed through records, research and inspection;

Budgeting, with all that goes with budgeting in the form of fiscal planning, accounting and control." (Gulick, 1937:13)

Links between politics (i.e. the resulting policy) and the subsequent administration of a program will be implemented through a bureau (Figure 1, middle left). But they may also involve a Chief Executive—via a President—and centralized bureau (Figure 2, upper left). The tasks associated with POSDCORB are their patterns. Congress or a Congressional subcommittee, as well as elements of the private sector (Figure 1 and 2, bottom), present forces, while the bureau leadership responds via POSDCORB tasks. These links will be shown in the patterns.

### TYPES OF COERCION, TYPES OF POLICY, AND TYPES OF POLITICS

Figure 3. Types of coercion, types of policy, and types of politics (From Theodore Lowi, 1972, p. 300.)

Public Policy Dimensions and Forces

As indicated, policies which are passed into law must be implemented by administrators. Considering Lowi's types, Ripley and Franklin described the implementation of policy (1986), as well as phases of political policy formulation (1991). These links will be used throughout the upcoming patterns. Specifically, they define various relations of sub-governments. These pertain to the receptive bureaucracy (i.e. Bureaus) and the Chief Executive (and centralized bureaucracy) and specific structures of Congress (i.e. Subcommittees). These elements also exist, to a degree, among state and local governments. The differentiations show distinct patterns in PP and PA. The various forces indicated in Lowi's original 1972 work can be seen in Figure 3. From here, we may identify various forces via—via likelihood or applicability—in Lowi's (1972) elements of coercion. Once a law is passed, the administrative response(s) follow POSDCORB with nuanced variations.

Sources of Information

Pulling ideas from practice, the author has been employed in each of the bureau types. This includes a Distributive bureau (Heath), a Redistributive agency (Welfare), a Constituent bureau (Administration), a Regulatory bureau (Motor Vehicles), and a revenue department (Taxation).[6] The author was also part of some sizable reengineering projects. Using enterprise frameworks, as well as enabling technologies, reorganizations were successful achieved.[7]

In assisting with the administration of software frameworks, multiple inheritance, polymorphism, encapsulation, empty classes and interfaces were utilized. The author is a Certified Government Financial Manager who has an awareness of funds. The theoretical works of PP and PA scholars were consulted and, in some cases, theory guided practice. However, most of the patterns (i.e. the problems and solutions) originate primarily from the author.

Limitations

A mention of limitations and qualifications are in order. The patterns below are certainly not the only PP and PA patterns; it is possible that many more are used. However, acknowledging the scope of Lowi's work (1972), as well as that of Gulick (1937), it is the interfaces that are of interest.

Structure

The unit of analysis is a political jurisdiction. The scope will be domestic policies. However, with control and coordination, layers, interfaces, and intergovernmental policies will be attempted. The structure of the patterns will be written in a variation of Alexander's (1979) format. The structures include:

Name in bold
Image (Diagram / Icon)
Alias
Synopsis/Quote in bold (Meier, 1987)
Context (Lowi, 1972)
Problem statement in bold: P-Policy-based, A-Administration-based.

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[6] Resulting largely from a co-authored performance audit, a large revenue function was moved via reorganization.
[7] These were in rule-bound bureaus: Motor Vehicles & Public Safety (1999-2002), as well as Taxation and a Secretary of State (2009-2012).

Description of the Problem and Forces
Solution in bold
Resulting Context
Related Patterns

Caps are used generously below to help reiterate pattern structure. The Names (bolded) were derived from Lowi (1972). An Image is provided. The Alias facilitates discussion of a pattern and, in these cases, they are the same as the names. The Synopses/Quotes (bolded) are one or two sentence abstracts summarizing a pattern, and in these instances, were developed by Kenneth Meier (1987). Note how these are quite broad, particularly with Constituent policies. To limit our scope, the Context (based on Lowi, 1972) indicates one or more of the following questions: where does the problem exist? . . . what is the relevancy? . . . and/or why are there constraints? The Problem Statement (bolded) indicates what problem is being solved. The author builds upon the context, as well as providing indications of how the problem fits a particular situation. The Forces indicate why a problem is so difficult, and constraints over which control may be possible. These are numerate with a prefix DIS for Distributive types, RED for Redistributive types, etc. The Solution/ resolution (bolded) succinctly states the action that should be taken to resolve the problem. This also includes results and these are similarly enumerated with the respective policy types. A Resulting Context indicates the situation after an attempt has been made to solve the problem (Hammer, Rehmer, & Rising, 2010).

Because of the many dimensions of PA and PP, a partial numbering scheme was developed to provide guidance. The intent is identify interfaces and to more closely group the solutions to the problems. As an example, the P2 Policy Solution (bolded) for Bureau Administrators is coupled with the range of Administrative Solutions (bolded), by addressing the Administrative range of forces (non-bolded). The POSDCORB elements are presented in reverse. Also, note how, in Figure 2, top-left, centralization may occur (Ripley & Franklin, 1991). If a rule creates an agency, according to Lowi (2010), it is a Constituent type. The series (4 total) interfaces with either a Chief Executive (2) or the Bureau administrator (2). These are designated as Key Links. This organization can be actually found in bureaus as the tasks for a Chief Executive will likely be delegated to deputies or assistant directors, or specialized central bureaus. However, he/she is ultimately responsible (via P2) for a policy implementation success (or failure).


Figure 4. Brick of Policy and Administration.

To help the readers (top-left, downward), a brick-like structure is in Figure 4. In terms of reading the patterns, some structural redundancy may be found. However, Lowi (1972) acknowledged this within his original case set. For a practitioner-based reader, try to discern the policy type you are most likely to implement, and then review that type. But be aware how readings may be directed to the Constituent type. For academic-based reading, an interest may lie more in cross-cutting views (i.e. central Personnel Administration – Staffing: DIS, RED, CON and REG). Since small variations exist--in pattern or in practice-- some can be combined (into CON), as it is modular on the brick. Note how personnel administration is often centralized (i.e. the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and state personnel functions).

The aggregations are simply socio-encapsulations in which administrative centralizations and reorganizations can occur. However, do not let the repetition turn to lull. Refined descriptions (i.e. whether a relationship is with a Congressional leader, of a Congressional Subcommittee) are provided and important (Ripley & Franklin, 1986; 1991). This repetition is evident, and previously discovered (Lowi, 1972), but indicative of prevalent POSDCORB-based patterns. Again, the primary policy differences are distinguished between a Chief Executive and a Bureau leader as related to members of Congress or Subcommittees. But encapsulation (via centralization) is common in administration.

Note also how it is acceptable for a pattern to have negative consequences. It is important that the intermediate effects are worth the long-term effort. For instance, some functions can be centralized and some simply cannot. This creates tension within an administrative domain. Additionally, the POSDCORB patterns may be applicable at various points in time, the most salient occurring during legislative sessions, especially when an agency is trying to secure a budget. Also note that policies can be enacted quickly – especially near the end of a session. The interfaces and relationships are presented below.

Distributive Policy   Alias – **Distribute**

"Distributive policymaking is the most common form of federal action to solve public problems. Government distributive policies use general tax revenue or other nonuser taxes to provide benefits directly to individuals" (Meier, 1987:94).

The context of the politics is that it is party-based, with electoral organization and logrolling (Lowi, 1972). Individuals and entities may need assistance and governments are sought out as a source of that assistance. The context of the policy that is it is decentralized, disaggregated, local-, interest- and identity-based under a remote likelihood of government coercion and associated with individual conduct (Lowi, 1972).

Organizational leaders want to administer their bureaus, but a policy may be flawed and/or the staff may be lacking; the coordination may seem impossible or the budget may have shortfalls. The reported results of an agency make them accountable. Legislators need budgetary projections to determine costs for constituent assistance. These projections include short-term growth for continuance, medium-term estimates for budgetary funding, and long-term visions for the future.

Policy Forces (Refer to Figure 1. for the appropriate triumvirate and Figure 4 for the position on matrix):

> (DIS.LEG Subcommittees are reliant on the bureaus for information, as well as constituents and the private Sector, for determining salient needs.)

Key Link: DIS.EXEC Bureaus make speculative projections regarding the private sector, while at the same time being cognizant of subcommittee proposals for legislation.

> (DIS - Private Sector entities monitor the performance of bureaus, as well as the feasibility of enabling or blocking legislation at the subcommittee level. Constituents in the public sector influence policy making by threatening to withhold their subsequent votes.)

Administrative Forces:

Budgeting – Sufficiency is required for a continuity of services and constituent growth may force the need for budget increase, but appropriations for those newly entitled may originate in a subcommittee.

Reporting – See CON.A2.

Coordinating – Complex intergovernmental coordination is required between agencies, but externalities will influence bureau operations.

Directing – Political forces, especially subcommittee members or external entities, may affect proposals.

Staffing – See CON.A5.

Organizing – See CON.A6.

Planning – Intra-organizational projects may involve contingencies which are beyond the scope of administrative control. Reorganizations may increase (reduce) organizational domain. (Also see CON.A7.)

Policy Solutions:

> **(DIS.LEG Legislators should maintain congenial relations with the receptive bureau as they have the most current information, as well as constituent desires.)**

KEY LINK: DIS.EXEC Bureaus should analyze the platform(s) of subcommittee members to detect, inform and project the impact of legislation, as well as private sector growth.

> **(DIS - Private sector representatives should associate constituents of subcommittee members, as well as bureau capabilities and limitations.)**

Administrative Solutions:

Budgeting – Make projections which can be periodically replicated. (Also see CON.A1.)

Reporting – See CON.A2.

Coordinating – Control objectively and coerce tactfully. As possible, coordinate inter-governmentally, collaborate resourcefully, and communicate organizationally.[8]

Directing – Develop maintenance level program scenarios. Inform and report prior policy results. Communicate authority-based contingencies. Propose legislative modifications. Detect proficiency requirements. Anticipate policy changes. Acknowledge accountability. Plan for budget periodicity. Invoke jurisprudence.

Staffing – See CON.A5.

**Organizing – See CON.A6.[9]**

Planning – See CON.A7. Also identifying intra-organizational contingencies, while foreseeing possible emergencies.

Resulting Context:

The development and convergence of a three way Distributive policy "Triangle" is more likely. The successful implementation of Distributive policies can occur with viable alternatives. But, because information must be coordinated, bureau leaders may be held accountable. They cannot provide uncontrolled informational access as political forces may add scrutiny (i.e. during implementation transitions). This is especially so in the specific case(s) of jurisprudence.

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[8] Suasion is unnecessary as constituents will solicit distributions.
[9] In the case of a Distributive agency reorganization, MSI with an emphasis on sufficiency would apply.

Redistributive Policy   Alias – **Redistribute**

"Redistributive policy entails taxing one group of people to provide benefits for a different group of people" (Meier, 1987:87).

The context of the politics is that it is group-based, with interest organization and bargaining (Lowi, 1972). Individuals and entities may need assistance and governments are sought out as a source. The context of the policy that is it is centralized, 'systems' level, cosmopolitan-, ideology- and status-based under an immediate likelihood of government coercion and associated within an environment of conduct (Lowi, 1972).

Organizational leaders are jurisprudent. They want to administer their bureaus, but a policy may be flawed; a bureau may be understaffed, the power to control may be lacking; or the revenues may be declining. The reported results of an agency make them, or the Chief Executive, accountable. Administrators need to secure a budget. Legislators need informational projections to detect the budgetary costs and the benefits of constituent assistance. These projections must include considerations of the ability of those who are taxed to pay, as well as administrative capabilities.

Policy Forces (Refer to Figure 2. for the appropriate triumvirate):

> (RED.LEG Congress is reliant on the Chief Executive for information, as well as the projected needs of private sector individuals and corporations. Policy making is influenced by high level decision-making.)

Key Link: RED.EXEC The Chief Executive obtains projections about the private sector, while at the same time being cognizant of Congressional proposals.

> (RED - Private sector entities monitors the performance of bureaus within the executive branch, as well as monitoring the feasibility of enabling or blocking Congressional legislation. Constituents or corporations influence policy making by threatening to withhold subsequent votes or funding.)

Administrative Forces:

Budgeting – Sufficiency is required for a continuity of services and constituent growth may force the need for a budget increase, but appropriations for those newly entitled may originate from Congress.

Reporting – See CON.A2.

Coordinating – Control in the Executive Branch is difficult as intergovernmental coordination is required between levels of government.

Directing – Political forces, Congressional members or external entities, may affect an Executive program or budget.

Staffing – See CON.A5.

Organizing – See CON.A6.

Planning - Inter-organizational projects may invoke contingencies beyond the scope of executive administrative control. (Also see CON.A7.)

Policy Solutions:

> **(RED.LEG Legislators should keep congenial relations with the Chief Executive and the receptive bureaus as they have up-to-date information. Legislators should also monitor the salience of constituent and public sector issues.)**

KEY LINK: RED.EXEC Bureaus should analyze the proposed legislation of Congress (possibly via subcommittee) to detect program and budgetary impact. They should also project public sector growth.

> **(RED - Private sector representatives should associate constituents of Congressional leaders and subcommittee members, as well as bureau capabilities and limitations.)**

Administrative Solutions:

Budgeting – Propose an executive budget based on existing levels of service and projected incoming revenues. (Also see CON.A1.)

Reporting – See CON.A2.

Coordinating – Communicate, with suasion, the Executive agenda. Control incoming revenues. Coordinate with budget calendars and guidelines. Collaborate with intergovernmental entities.

Directing – Develop clear and concise messages. Maintain levels of service based on prior policies and current requirements. Propose modifications to programs or previous budget as appropriate. Anticipate policy changes and contingencies. Invoke jurisprudence with values as necessary.

Staffing – See CON.A5.

Organizing – See CON.A6.[10]

Planning – See CON.A7. Also identifying inter-organizational contingencies, while foreseeing possible emergencies.

Resulting Context:

Improved relations between the Chief Executive, bureau leadership, Congressional members, subcommittee members and the private sector can be achieved. The successful implementation of Redistributive policies is more likely with consensus on salient needs.

But, challenged attempts at policy implementation will expose political values. This may occur for the policy initiator, Congressional member, or the Chief Executive. Reported results may become catalysts for subsequent policy change. Also, leadership values may be exposed. This may occur at the Executive-, cabinet-, or bureau-levels. Reported results may become catalysts for subsequent policy change.

Constituent Policy   Alias – **Constitute**

Constituent policies are "those intended to benefit government in general or the nation as a whole" (Meier, 1987:102).

The context of the politics is that it is party-based, with electoral organization and logrolling (Lowi, 1972). This policy type can be wide ranging—including the suspension of rules. The policy is centralized, 'systems' level, cosmopolitan-, ideology- and status-based (Lowi, 1972) under a varied likelihoods of government coercion or suasion and associated within an environment of conduct (Lowi, 1972).

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[10] In the case of Redistributive policies, a reorganization may include multiple bureaus (i.e. revenue- and distribution-based) and accordingly, RMSI and the behavior of paying, and MSI with an emphasis on sufficiency, would apply.

The formulation of policies and the development of legislation is complex. Changes to legislation are difficult and implementing most policies is a challenge. Within Constituent type policies, a wide range of power, coercion and/or suasion may be invoked. Elected officials have political values and developing laws about laws is the ultimate empowerment. Rules can change.[11] To expose those values may mean that the incumbent can no longer get elected. Organizational leaders--especially administrators--are jurisprudent. Some Constituent policies may be beyond their span of control.[12] They want to administer their bureaus, but a policy may be flawed and the power to control may be missing.[13]The revenues may be declining, or the budget may be incomplete. The reported informational results of an agency make them, the Chief Executive, or elected officials accountable.

Legislators need to administer rules. Changes within other policymaking or inter-organizational entities will encroach. Rules about rules are necessary for day-to-day policy-making. Legislators need budgetary projections to detect program costs. These projections must include the ability to offset expenses with revenues. Due to constituent assistance or program growth, the need for prioritized capital expenditures (i.e. institutions or facilities) is necessary.

If financing is not allocated or earmarked, it needs to originate from the jurisdiction's General Fund. Since General Fund monies are shared, they are very contentious. Funding spent on one program or expense is done at the expense of something else. Subsequently, the values of elected officials— whether the Chief Executive or a legislator—will be exposed. Scrutiny comes especially when proposing to increase revenues via taxes. In these instances, the media and/or other external forces will illuminate values. Thus, efficiencies are key in trying to cut administrative expenses. Central services or reorganizations may be an option.

Policy Forces:

> (CON.LEG Congress is reliant on the Chief Executive for information, as well as his/her plan—via an executive budget. The projected needs of private sector individuals and corporations also need to be considered. Congress will also obtain feedback from, and information about, constituents. The salience of issues in the private sector is influential to policy-making.)

Key Link: CON.EXEC The Chief Executive develops and seeks approval for an organization-wide budget. He/she will obtain projections about the private sector, while at the same time being cognizant of Congressional proposals for legislation.

> (CON - Private sector entities monitor the performance of bureaus and budgetary requests, as well as the feasibility of enabling or blocking legislation.)

Administrative Forces:

CON.A1 Budgeting – Sufficiency is required for a continuity of services and constituent growth may force the need for a budget increase, but appropriations for those newly entitled may originate from Congress after being discussed in a subcommittee.

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[11] The ability to change rules pertaining to law denotes power. The ability to wield rules pertaining to law indicates powerfulness.

[12] Administrators may need additional power to implement a program, so they may seek legislative authority.

[13] In these instances, the ability for coercion is limited, so they may invoke suasion.

CON.A2 Reporting – (Also DIS, RED and REG.) External and internal reporting, via one or more bureaus, may not accurately portray the status of a program/budget. Further, reports can heavily influence legislative and subcommittee decision-making.

CON.A3 Coordinating – Control in the Executive Branch may be difficult as intergovernmental coordination is required between levels of government.

CON.A4 Directing – Political forces, Congressional members or external entities, may affect an Executive program or budget.

CON.A5 Staffing – (Also DIS, RED and REG.) Competent staff are required to provide information and objectively classify those to be taxed and others who have beneficial entitlement.

CON.A6 Organizing – (Also DIS, RED and REG.) Bureaus must be organized to efficiently administer transactions, funds and organizational interfaces.

CON.A7 Planning – Plans for budgets, appropriations and appropriateness will be required by the legislators. Intra- or inter-organizational projects may invoke contingencies beyond the scope of administrative or executive control. Reorganizations may increase or reduce an organizational domain.

Policy Solutions:

>**(CON.LEG Legislators should keep congenial relations with other Legislators, the Chief Executive and the receptive bureaus as they have up-to-date information. Monitor constituent and public sector salience of issues. Consider changing the rules if absolutely necessary and empowered to do so. Consider increasing or decreasing a level of bureau authority. Invoke values.)**

KEY LINK: CON.EXEC Bureaus should analyze the proposed legislation of Congress (via subcommittee) to detect program and budget impact. Project public sector growth and environment of conduct. Consider Executive Order. Invoke values.

>**(CON - Private sector representatives should associate constituents of Congressional leaders and subcommittee members, as well as bureau capabilities and limitations. Portray level of power, coercion or suasion.)**

Administrative Solutions:

CON.A1 Budgeting – (Also DIS, RED and REG.) Propose an Executive budget based on existing levels of service and projected incoming revenues, informatively totaling impacts of past legislation and environment- and human-based encroachments, as well as requested legislative enhancements. Prioritize capital expenditures. Address contingencies for Public Works projects. Consider intergovernmental revenues and expenditures.

CON.A2 Reporting – (Also DIS and RED.) Control centralized information resource management entities with administrative policy, proposing efficient and effective ways to deliver reports and services, ensuring informational timeliness, accuracy and availability. In some instances, arguments can be made for decentralized reporting or operations.

CON.A3 Coordinating – Communicate Executive agenda. As possible, control other entities with budgetary guidelines, coordinate subordinate bureaus with budget calendars, and collaborate with intergovernmental entities.[14] Discuss impacts with other agencies to detect plausible solutions.[15]

CON.A4 Directing – Develop clear and concise messages. Maintain levels of service based on prior policies and current requirements. Propose modifications to programs or previous budget as appropriate. Anticipate policy changes and contingencies. Invoke jurisprudence with values as necessary.

CON.A5 Staffing – (Also DIS, RED and REG.) Through centralized personnel administration or authorized exemption, project staffing needs for the maintenance of programs and proposed enhancements to operations or changes to enforcement.

CON.A6 Organizing – (Also DIS, RED and REG.) Promulgate, and communicate to the legislature, best organizational practices, including a possible reorganization.[16] This may include increasing control via central purchasing, fleets, audits, public works, or more. But in some instances, administrative decentralization and coordination may be appropriate.

CON.A7 Planning – (Also DIS and RED.) Plan by controlling Bureau requests, anticipating clientele growth and identifying contingencies.

Resulting Context:

The securing of an executive budget and the successful implementation of Constituent policies is more likely with consensus on salient needs. Reported results and/or budget shortfalls may be catalysts for policy change.[17] Challenged attempts at policy implementation, as well as the securing of a politicized budget, may expose values. Projections are primary to other budget decisions and/or contingencies.[18] The staff will become more knowledgeable of administrative complexities due to the varied planning requirements of an organization (i.e. forecasting and foreseeing).

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[14] Succinctly, the full spectrum of power, coercion and suasion may be present.

[15] Collaborative problem solving between executive branch agencies has increased in recent years.

[16] Reorganizing Constituent-based agencies invokes the highest levels of coordination. Carrying out laws about laws, most of the practices of MSI, RMSI, OP and SE would be invoked.

[17] If too much power is used, the public may perceive a decision-maker has overstepped his/her bounds.

[18] If not enough power is used, or increased authority is not sought, the public may perceive weak leadership.

Regulatory Policy   Alias – **Regulate**

"Regulatory policy is government restriction of individual choice so as to keep conduct from transcending acceptable bounds" (Meier, 1987:77).

The context of the politics is that it is group-based, with interest organization and bargaining (Lowi, 1972). The policy is decentralized, disaggregated, local-, interest- and identity-based under an immediate likelihood of government coercion and based on individual conduct (Lowi, 1972). Some individuals and entities may need protection from others. Government may be perceived as an enabler of reduced competition. In contrast, some constituents have a dislike for government and may seek advantage and competition.

Organizational leaders must secure a budget. Some regulations present a challenge to ensure compliance. Leaders want to administer their bureaus, but a policy may be flawed; jurisprudence may be necessary; their staff may lack training; the budget may have shortfalls; or their authority may be lacking. The reported results of an agency make the administrator, the Chief Executive or the legislators accountable. Authorization and resources for regulatory agencies are limited. Prior legislation under enactment requires assessments of authority. An increase in constituents requires increases in budgets or staff.

Policy Forces:

> (REG.LEG Congress is reliant on the Chief Executive for information, as well as the influence of current and projected individuals or corporations under compliance. They feel pressure to change regulation of the private sector and/or competition.)

Key Link: REG.EXEC The Chief Executive obtains projections on compliance, while at the same time being cognizant of Congressional proposals–either protection- or competition-based.

(REG - Private sector entities monitor the promulgation and communication of policies, and the subsequent enforcement of bureaus within the executive branch, as well as the feasibility of reducing regulations or decreasing competition via legislators.)

Administrative Forces:

Budgeting – sufficiency is required for the continuity of services. Increases in individual or corporate non-compliance may force a budgetary shortfall, but appropriations may originate, depending on salience, from Congress after being discussed in a subcommittee.

Reporting – See CON.A2. Additionally, compliance reporting may incorrectly evaluate the status of program protection or competition.

Coordinating – Control in the Executive Branch may be difficult as intergovernmental regulations are required between jurisdictions.

Directing – Political forces, especially Congressional members or external entities, may reveal non-compliance as administered by an executive branch agency.

Staffing – See CON.A5. Additionally, trained staff are required to provide specialized information and enforce objectively.

Organizing – See CON.A6. Additionally, bureaus may be decentralized for enforcement.

Planning – Intra-organizational compliance may span jurisdictional boundaries that are beyond the scope of administrative control. (Also see CON.A7)

Policy Solutions:

> **(REG.LEG Legislators should keep congenial relations with the Chief Executive and the receptive bureau as they have up-to-date information. The media and other external sources should be monitored for salient constituent and/or public sector non-compliance.)**

KEY LINK: REG.EXEC Bureaus should analyze the proposed legislation of Congress (via subcommittee) to detect program impact and budget sufficiency. Bureaus should also report enforcement, while projecting public sector and/or individual non-compliance.

> **(REG - Public Sector representatives should associate constituents of Congressional leaders and subcommittee members, as well as bureau capabilities and limitations of enforcing compliance.)**

Administrative Solutions:

Budgeting – Secure a budget. Seek efficiencies to control expenses. Discern authority and/or ways to propose or invoke revenue. (Also see CON.A1.)

Reporting – Evaluate agency operations. Report and publish regulatory standards efficiently and effectively. Develop and report policy alternatives, as well as the associated benefits and costs.

Coordinating – Communicate, with suasion, compliance-based standards. As possible, control compliance behavior with budget and staff. Coordinate and interface with other bureaus. Collaborate

with intergovernmental regulators. Determine and communicate the consequences for non-compliance.[19]

Directing – Develop clear and concise regulations. Promulgate and communicate agency-based policies. Maintain levels of enforcement based on prior policies and enacted legislation. Propose modifications to compliance, programs or budget–especially if inter-governmental. Facilitate training or certification of staff. Anticipate regulation or policy changes with contingencies. Acknowledge administrative judgment. Invoke jurisprudence.

Staffing – See CON.A5, especially regarding changes to enforcement.

Organizing – See CON.A6.[20]

Planning – Project short-, mid- and long-term compliance by assessing requirements, anticipating non-compliant growth, while discerning how others enforce.

Resulting Context:

The successful implementation of protective- or competition-based policies is more likely if there is a consensus on salient needs; however, challenged attempts at compliance will expose political values. This may occur for the policy initiator, Congressional member, or the Chief Executive. Reports of non-compliance may result in subsequent policy change and, in addition, leadership values regarding compliance will be exposed. This may occur at the Executive-, cabinet-, or bureau-levels. Reported non-compliance may become catalysts for subsequent policy change.

Discussion

The four patterns reveal how most, if not all, of the administrative POSDCORB tasks are applicable in response to a political force. The key links were described. The interface between politics and administration vary; one could be between the Chief Executive and Congress (i.e. Redistributive) or between a Bureau and a Subcommittee (i.e. Distributive). Combinations, via centralization, are possible. And some solutions are nuanced. Variations of the policy relationships were detected, documented and diagrammed by Ripley and Franklin (1991) and their links were followed.

An encapsulation of functions, via aggregation, may occur. This is most applicable when considering centralization or a reorganization. For instance, MSI has been extended to include *behaviors* of individuals (cf. Regulatory type policies), *values* of politics (Constituent-based) or *sufficiency* of budgets (Distributive and Redistributive policies). Again, combinations exist. An agency reorganization would ultimately require the use of MSI, OP and SE. And, more than one agency would be involved, for instance central personnel or central information resource management (IRM). Empirical evidence was indicated for the last group, revealing control and coordination over time (Chalekian, 2013a). Partial control/centralization, with budgets and planning (i.e. capital projects), is also likely.

As with the triangles of policy-making, an extended range of relationships was suggested. In figures 1 and 2, attention should focus on the prominent arrows. In addition to the seven elements of POSDCORB, discussions of MSI, OP and SE could make a bureau reorganization – or the implementation

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[19] The full spectrum of Power, Coercion and Suasion.
[20] In the case of a Regulatory agency reorganization, MSI with an emphasis on behaviors would apply.

of policy – more efficient. In the case of Redistributive policy types, Reverse Multiple Social Inheritance (RMSI) may be applicable. Liabilities may exist–in terms of revealing the values of a politician, or the behaviors of constituents. And on the administrative side, there may be non-sufficiency by a Chief Executive, or a flawed implementation attempt by an administrator. The practices of control (using centralization), and coordination (via decentralization), must be continually evaluated.

Towards a Synthesis

Polycentricity has been detected within government activities, as well as a design principle called "Nested Enterprises" (Ostrom, 2005, p. 269). Reading *within* a pattern (a practitioner view), the policy and administration descriptions are wide. But reading *between* the patterns (an academic view), some redundancy can be observed. With the techniques of OP, MSI, and SE, it may be possible to generalize links between PP and PA. After breaking them apart, it is now times to gather them together. In doing so, the reader can move toward the essence of political interfaces and administration.

Upon closure of a legislative session (if not before), it is up to an agency administrator to discern which administrative actions are to receive the most attention.[21] In leadership, knowing what to emphasize is key. For instance, with centralized functions like personnel, some tasks require less attention. By determining the policy type they are accountable for (Distributive, Redistributive, Constituent, or Regulatory), administrators can prioritize implementations.

With centralization, parameterized tasks can be grouped, and—to some degree-- they will be handled. Considering Lowi's completeness, three parameters exist. Note how MSI refers to information and behavior or values or sufficiency. Information is *always* passed in a law. But it may focus on a single policy type (i.e. behavior). If a law is about behaviors, it is a Regulatory type. If instead it is about values, then it is a Constituent type. The same applies to sufficiency (money) and Distributive types.

In the American states, let us consider the program for federal FEMA (or at the state level, emergency preparedness.) The sufficiency practice will be revealed. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, it would be bureaucratic to slow the flow of funds for approvals, especially between layers of government. This program-based money is to be transferred quickly between various levels of government. Layers at the federal, state and local levels indicate nested layers or MSI. According to one framework scholar, "[S]maller-scale organizations tend to be nested in ever larger organizations" (Ostrom, 2005, p. 269).

In short, money or resources are passed directly from the federal government, through the states (with less administrative oversight), to the local governments and/or individuals. As grant writers know, other variations exist whereby state and local entities may tally funds, but they may not wholly administer them. In this instance, there are two "empty classes" whereby the state and local levels have reduced administrative oversight. Thus, there are templates for administration, but they are less invoked.

Thus, an "empty class" could be based vertical centralization or horizontal "pass through." For central personnel administration (staffing), a budget clearance and a requisition may be all that is required. The later steps to hire are, to some extent, decentralized. For "pass through" emergency management, delays would not be tolerated.   By integrating the prior concepts—centralization and pass-through—examples of an "Empty class" are evident.

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[21] Administrators review their budgets and laws with immediate implementation dates are primary.

An "empty class" structure can exist with the help of centralization, but the task is not--or is only partially--implemented. What should be the criteria? Via Gulick, we know most, if not all of the administrative responses are invoked--Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Reporting and Budgeting. However others—Directing and Coordinating—may be too nuanced to be centralized. As a whole, these are the seven developed by Gulick. But, a class shall be deemed "empty" if less than half of the POSDCORB tasks are required to partially implement a program, or hire, at a particular level.

Accountability

The Chief Executive is ultimately be responsible for the successful implementation of all policies. But for Distributive, Redistributive and Regulatory implementation (as well as some aspects of Constituent policies), the relationships lessened in Distributive and Regulatory types. A Distributive budget would indeed be included in an upper-most Executive Budget, but according to Ripley & Franklin (1991), the program and budgetary discussions are more within subcommittees and beneath the full congress. In short, the interfaces are different as they apply at a lower level. While not entirely "empty" of dialogue, these approach more of an "empty class."

Reorganizations are developed at the top-most administrative levels. If a rule creates an agency, per Lowi, the policy is a Constituent type (2010). These promote widespread organizational change and encapsulation can occur. This is in contrast to incremental policymaking (with small adjustments). The reason is that one or more receptive bureaucracies may be combined, split, or terminated. The author has been influential in a split (Motor Vehicles & Public Safety) and with a combination (Taxation). In these instances, the practices of MSI, OP, SE and RMSI were invoked. Organizations are increasingly tied to technologies, and those interfaces are developed by engineers who use polymorphism, inheritance and encapsulation. With variations on those themes (i.e. increased socio- or human-based elements), the underlying principles are revealed. The identification of interfaces in any reorganizational is key.

Finally, Object-oriented Government terms were extended from Goldberg and Rubin (1995). Some may take issue with the author's inexactness. However, in a content analysis, one researcher found variations of terms, even within engineering (Armstrong, 2006). Since this is an *interdisciplinary* effort, a borrowing of terms may be graciously granted. When merging two wide frameworks (i.e. the conceptual works of Lowi and Gulick), there is bound to be incongruence.

Conclusion

With Lowi's policy types and Gulick's administrative tasks, the linked relationships--via Ripley and Franklin--were identified. Viewed from a policy perspective, interfaces can be established and maintained. The presence of one or more "empty classes" in government was also suggested. This may result from a centralized function or a "pass through." The nuanced relationships between policy and implementation can become clearer. This includes MSI and considerations of values, behaviors, and sufficiency. At least one social science design principle (Ostrom, 2005) of nested-ness was integrated. The patterns added improved clarity to complex political processes. As a result of public policy, they provide partial administrative guidance.

This paper presents the work of others in another way; thus, it is an integration of concepts. By looking at the various policy types, a broader language of administration can be developed. It will be the work of others to detect how well these concepts extend. But, in the meanwhile, a more refined picture of public policy and administration could be discerned.

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Glossary

Administrator – The leader of a bureau or organization.

Base Class – The topmost class in a framework.

Bureaucracy – A government organization authorized to implement a policy.

Chief Executive – The highest level leader of a set of bureaus. In the American states, this is the President. In a specific state it is a governor. In some jurisdictions, it is a Minister.

Class – "[A] template for the creation of instances" (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p. 505)

Empty Class – An entity whereby a structure is present, but little – if any – administration occurs (i.e. limited budgetary oversight).

Entitlement – A law which specifies how individuals may become beneficiaries.

General Fund – A fund with monies not designated or earmarked for a specific purpose.

Iron Triangle – A policymaking relationship consisting of a bureau, congressional subcommittee, and private sector constituents. Variations include a triangle consisting of a centralized bureaucracy via Chief Executive, Congressional leadership, and private sector constituents or corporations.

Largess – Money, resources, or something of value bestowed.

Multiple Social Inheritance (MSI) – The feature of a language which supports the definition of a new entity as an extension of one or more existing entities, such that the new entity inherits existing information and behavior or values or sufficiency.

Object-oriented – "A product, process, or resource that can be extended by composition of existing parts or by refinement of behaviors" (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p. 512)

Object-oriented Government – The hallmarks include a "[d]elegation of responsibility to operating units, loosely coupled dependencies among these operating units, and reuse of policies and procedures" (Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p. 49)

Organizational Polymorphism (OP) – The feature of a language making it possible to send the same message to different objects or people and elicit a distinct but semantically similar response from objects or people, with coordination and control.

Socio-encapsulation (SE) – The feature of a language which supports the representation of information and information processing as a single unit that combines the behavior or values or sufficiency with the information needed to carry out the behavior or values or sufficiency.

Receptive Bureaucracy – A bureau designated to carry out or implement public policy.